The Disastrous Implications of the 'English' View of Rationality in a Social World

Social Epistemology 33 (1):88-99 (2019)
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Abstract
Van Fraassen (2007, 2017) consistently uses the English view of rationality to parry criticisms from scientific realists. I assume for the sake of argument that the English view of rationality is tenable, and then argue that it has disastrous implications for van Fraassen’s (1980) contextual theory of explanation, for the empiricist position that T is empirically adequate, and for scientific progress. If you invoke the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve that your epistemic colleagues’ theories are true, they might, in turn, invoke it to rationally disbelieve that your positive theories are true.
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2019
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First archival date: 2018-11-13
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