Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):65-81 (2018)
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Abstract

This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p. It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.

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Andrew Peet
UmeƄ University

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