DESCRIPTION, ESPACE LOGIQUE ET ENJEU DE L'IMPLICATION DE L'OUVERTURE AU LANGAGE POUR LA CONCEPTION DU JUGEMENT DE LA LOGIQUE DE PORT-ROYAL

Logique Et Analyse 249 (249-250):79-95 (2020)
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Abstract

In this study, I intend to show how and why, in the Port-Royal Logic, a singular term can reveal the nature of the logical judgment in the handbook. As I argue, the treatment given to one of thee singular terms, namely, the defined descriptions, in the terminology introduced by Russell, leads to an opening to langage that sounds unexpected and unjustified. Considering the privilege of thinking over langage and also that judgment is the mental act that defines logic, however, we may understand how the authors regard langage, in relation to the epistemic constituents, namely, the mental acts within the terms. In doing so we are compelled to recognize the implications of this step towards pragmatism in fixing the meaning of defined descriptions to the nature of judgment in the handbook. This opening to langage reveals the conception of judgment as a twofold mental act: a formal and a practical (moral and theological) one.

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Katarina Peixoto
University of São Paulo

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