Analogy, Mind, and Life

In Quoc Nam Tran & Hamid Arabnia (eds.), Emerging Trends in Computational Biology, Bioinformatics, and Systems Biology. Elsevier. pp. 377–388 (2015)
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Abstract

I'll show that the kind of analogy between life and information [argued for by authors such as Davies (2000), Walker and Davies (2013), Dyson (1979), Gleick (2011), Kurzweil (2012), Ward (2009)] – that seems to be central to the effect that artificial mind may represent an expected advance in the life evolution in the Universe – is like the design argument, and that if the design argument is unfounded and invalid, the argument to the effect that artificial mind may represent an expected advance in the life evolution in the Universe is also unfounded and invalid. However, if we are prepared to admit (though we should not do so) this method of reasoning as valid, I'll show that the analogy between life and information to the effect that artificial mind may represent an expected advance in the evolution of life in the Universe seems to suggest some type of reductionism of life to information, but biology respectively chemistry, or physics are not reductionist, contrary to what seems to be suggested by the analogy between life and information.

Author's Profile

Vitor Manuel Dinis Pereira
University of Lisbon

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