On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation

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In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation or abduction that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey Douven’s worries and bring to bear a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments to show that Bayes’ Rule really is the only correct way to respond to your evidence.
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Archival date: 2020-10-16
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