Intuition, self-evidence, and understanding

In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford: OUP. pp. 28-44 (2016)
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Abstract

Here I criticise Audi's account of self-evidece. I deny that understanding of a proposition can justify belief in it and offfer an account of intuition that can take the place of understanding in an account of self-evidence.

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Philip Stratton-Lake
University of Reading

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