Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; or, how to build a socially adept robot

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45 (2022)
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Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-types are the “cognitive primitives” that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.

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Ben Phillips
Arizona State University


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