La explicación en ciencias sociales: argumento de la complejidad de los fenómenos y el materialismo histórico

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I will review the argument from complexity of the phenomena represented by Hayek (1967) that asserts that the human phenomena are, in some way, inherently complex, thus, that the laws in social sciences are not available in principle; and by Scriven (1956), who asserts a more elaborate version of the argument from complexity, given space for the possibility that the complexity is not intrinsic to the social phenomena, but that they are constitutive to the level of description that we are interested in. Against both, following McIntyre (1993) I will hold that they would be, by one hand, idealizing the scientific practice and, by the other hand, not being able to explain the social phenomena to the level that we are interested in because they end up by eliminating it. Then, in a second part, I will expose the role of explanation in historical materialism (from an analytical marxist perspective) trying to conciliate the functionalism exposed by Cohen (2001) and the methodological pluralism of Little (1991). Historical materialism, by modifying the conception of the constitution of society (substituting the methodological individualism for a structural analysis with a primacy of the socio-economical social relations) allows us even to lay the necessary foundations for identifying, in a non-abstract nor idealized way, the rational agency of individuals that constitute the social classes. This proves an advantage over methodological individualism in that it does not eliminates the phenomena that are being explained
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