Disjunctivism and Scepticism

In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic (forthcoming)
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Abstract

An overview of the import of disjunctivism to the problem of radical scepticism is offered. In particular, the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience is set out, along with the manner in which it intersects with related positions such as naïve realism and intentionalism, and it is shown how this account can be used to a motivate an anti-sceptical proposal. In addition, a variety of disjunctivism known as epistemological disjunctivism is described, and it is explained how this proposal offers a further way of responding to radical scepticism.

Author Profiles

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam

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