Thinking the impossible
Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2649-2662 (2016)
Abstract
The article looks at the structure of impossible worlds, and their deployment in the analysis of some intentional notions. In particular, it is argued that one can, in fact, conceive anything, whether or not it is impossible. Thus a semantics of conceivability requires impossible worlds.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PRITTI-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-03-19
View upload history
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?Chalmers, David
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Yablo, Stephen
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Priest, Graham
Impossible Worlds.Berto, Francesco
View all 15 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Modal Objectivity.Justin, Clarke-Doane
Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality.Mallozzi, Antonella
Knowing How Things Might Have Been.Jago, Mark
View all 9 citations / Add more citations
Added to PP index
2016-04-08
Total views
471 ( #5,867 of 40,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
136 ( #2,978 of 40,753 )
2016-04-08
Total views
471 ( #5,867 of 40,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
136 ( #2,978 of 40,753 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.
