The tractatus on inference and entailment

In Erich Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein: Essays on Early Analytic Philosophy, 283–307. Oxford University Press (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein criticizes Frege and Russell's view that laws of inference (Schlussgesetze) "justify" logical inferences. What lies behind this criticism, I argue, is an attack on Frege and Russell's conceptions of logical entailment. In passing, I examine Russell's dispute with Bradley on the question whether all relations are "internal".

Author's Profile

Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,337 (#7,439)

6 months
121 (#25,197)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?