Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):319-346 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities

Author's Profile

Stephen Puryear
North Carolina State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-04-13

Downloads
826 (#15,405)

6 months
93 (#38,462)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?