Assessing Recent Agent-Based Accounts of Right Action

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):433-444 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Agent-based virtue ethical theories must deal with the problem of right action: if an action is right just in case it expresses a virtuous motive, then how can an agent perform the right action but for the wrong reason, or from a vicious motive? Some recent agent-based accounts purport to answer this challenge and two other related problems. Here I assess these accounts and show them to be inadequate answers to the problem of right action. Overall, it is shown that the most recent and promising attempts at squaring agent-based virtue ethics with commonsense morality are flawed, and so, the case for agent-basing in general that much dimmer.

Author's Profile

Graham Renz
Marian University

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-05

Downloads
208 (#63,976)

6 months
84 (#44,194)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?