MacFarlane on relative truth

Philosophical Issues 16 (1):88–100 (2006)
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Abstract

John MacFarlane has made relativism popular again. Focusing just on his original discussion, I argue that the data he uses to motivate the position do not, in fact, motivatie it at all. Many of the points made here have since been made, independently, by Hermann Cappelen and John Hawthorne, in their book Relativism and Monadic Truth.

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Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University

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