On the Rational Impotence of Urges

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):70-75 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Intuitively, it seems that certain basic desires, or urges, are rationally impotent, i.e., that they provide no reasons for action (a famous example is Warren Quinn's story of a man who has a brute urge to turn on every radio he sees). This intuition seems to conflict with the internalist, or Humean subjectivist, claim that our desires give us reasons. But Harry Frankfurt's well-known subjectivist account, with its distinction between first- order and higher-order desires and its concepts of identification and commitment, may be able to accommodate this intuition. Regan Lance Reitsma has argued that to do so, it needs to be supplemented with a concept of "personal ideals", which demand that we give no normative weight to certain inclinations. I argue that Reitsma's account depends on the unexplained assumption that some kinds of desire have special standing, and thus cannot improve on the explanation of the rational impotence of urges already available to Frankfurt.

Author's Profile

Simon Rippon
Central European University

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-12

Downloads
214 (#62,880)

6 months
32 (#87,063)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?