Physicalism and Supervenience: A Case for a New Sense of Physical Duplication

Erkenntnis 81 (4):669-681 (2016)
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Abstract

Physicalism is the view, roughly, that everything is physical. This thesis is often characterized in terms of a particular supervenience thesis. Central to this thesis is the idea of physical duplication. I argue that the standard way of understanding physical duplication leads—along with other claims—to a sub-optimal consequence for the physicalist. I block this consequence by shifting to an alternative sense of physical duplication. I then argue that physicalism is best characterized by a supervenience thesis that employs both the new sense of physical duplication and a new class of possible worlds.

Author's Profile

Michael Roche
Idaho State University

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