Physicalism and Supervenience: A Case for a New Sense of Physical Duplication
Erkenntnis 81 (4):669-681 (2016)
Abstract
Physicalism is the view, roughly, that everything is physical. This thesis is often characterized in terms of a particular supervenience thesis. Central to this thesis is the idea of physical duplication. I argue that the standard way of understanding physical duplication leads—along with other claims—to a sub-optimal consequence for the physicalist. I block this consequence by shifting to an alternative sense of physical duplication. I then argue that physicalism is best characterized by a supervenience thesis that employs both the new sense of physical duplication and a new class of possible worlds.
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.Lewis, David
A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.Melnyk, Andrew
Supervenience and Microphysics.Horgan, Terence E.
Exclusion Again.Bennett, Karen
Supervenience.McLaughlin, Brian
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2015-08-26
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2015-08-26
Total downloads
125 ( #18,474 of 37,106 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #19,915 of 37,106 )
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