Physicalism and Supervenience: A Case for a New Sense of Physical Duplication

Erkenntnis 81 (4):669-681 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Physicalism is the view, roughly, that everything is physical. This thesis is often characterized in terms of a particular supervenience thesis. Central to this thesis is the idea of physical duplication. I argue that the standard way of understanding physical duplication leads—along with other claims—to a sub-optimal consequence for the physicalist. I block this consequence by shifting to an alternative sense of physical duplication. I then argue that physicalism is best characterized by a supervenience thesis that employs both the new sense of physical duplication and a new class of possible worlds.

Author's Profile

Michael Roche
Idaho State University


Added to PP

552 (#29,892)

6 months
107 (#38,643)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?