Derivative Differential Responsibility: A Reply to Peels

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):139-151 (2018)
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Abstract

At the heart of Rik Peels’s Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology is the idea that responsibility for belief ought to be understood on the model of responsibility for states of affairs that are subject to our influence but not under our intentional control, or what he calls derivative responsibility. In this article, I argue that reflection on the nature and scope of derivative responsibility reveals important lacunae in Peels’s account of responsible belief and his account of responsibility for belief.

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Benjamin Rossi
Duke University

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