A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

Noûs 52 (2):473-478 (2018)
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Abstract
We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.
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First archival date: 2016-08-15
Latest version: 2 (2016-08-16)
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2016-08-15

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