A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

Noûs 52 (2):473-478 (2018)
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We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.

Author Profiles

Daniel Rothschild
University College London
Levi Spectre
Open University of Israel


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