Epistemic Self-Doubt

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017)
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Abstract
When we get evidence that tells us our belief-forming mechanisms may not be reliable this presents a thorny set of questions about whether and how to revise our original belief. This article analyzes aspects of the problem and a variety of approaches to its solution.
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First archival date: 2020-06-28
Latest version: 2 (2020-06-28)
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