A methodological argument against scientific realism

Synthese 198 (3):2153-2167 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.

Author's Profile

Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-06-09

Downloads
503 (#35,070)

6 months
106 (#43,273)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?