Schrödinger’s Fetus

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):125-130 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger’s Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger’s Fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger’s Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad absurdum that pro-life and pro-choice positions face. It also gives a simple solution to the problem of prenatal harm.

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Joona Räsänen
University of Turku

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