Metaphysically Opaque Grounding

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Abstract
It is commonly assumed that metaphysical grounding is an especially intimate and powerful connection between facts that enables a form of explanation which is particularly strict and illuminating. An arguably related idea is that grounding is necessarily connected with the core features of things – their essences or natures. This article is concerned with metaphysically opaque grounding – a form of grounding which falsifies both these ideas. I argue that there are important views in metaphysics that are committed to there being cases of metaphysically opaque grounding, explore some important consequences for the theory of grounding, and defend the notion of opaque grounding from objections. The upshot is that metaphysicians should be free to avail themselves of the concept of metaphysically opaque grounding in their theorizing.
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Archival date: 2021-04-28
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