Truth About Artifacts

Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 10 (1):149-152 (2023)
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Abstract

Truth in a correspondence sense is objective in two ways. It is objective because the relation of correspondence is objective and because the facts to which truths correspond are objective. Truth about artifacts is problematic because artifacts are intentionally designed to perform certain functions, and so are not entirely mind independent. Against this, it is argued in this paper that truth about artifacts is perfectly objective despite the role played by intention and purpose in the production of artifacts.

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Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

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