Sherrilyn Roush: Tracking truth: Knowledge, evidence, and science [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):158-159 (2007)
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Abstract

This book is a comprehensive defence of a modified Nozickian tracking account of knowledge. The account is presented as an analysis of knowledge, rather than justification. Roush allows that a tracking analysis of justification may be possible. But she denies that justification is required for knowledge. Her view is externalist, but not reliabilist.

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Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

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