Deferring to Doubt

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290 (2022)
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In this paper I’ll suggest that a certain challenge facing defeatist views about higher order evidence cannot be met, namely, motivating principles that recommend abandoning belief in cases of higher order defeat, but do not recommend global skepticism. I'll propose that, ultimately, the question of whether to abandon belief in response to the realization that our belief can’t be recovered from what I’ll call ‘a perspective of doubt’ can’t be answered through rational deliberation aimed at truth or accuracy.

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Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin


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