Free Will of an Ontologically Open Mind

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Combining elements from algorithmic information theory and quantum mechanics, it has earlier been argued that consciousness is epistemically and ontologically emergent. Accordingly, consciousness is irreducible to neural low-level states, in spite of assuming causality and supervenience on these states. The mind-body problem is thus found to be unsolvable. In this paper the implications on free will is studied. In the perspective of a modified definition of free will, enabling scientific decidability, the ontological character of interactions of the cortical neural network is discussed. Identifying conscious processes as ontologically open, it is asserted that conscious states are indeterminable in principle. We argue that this leads to freedom of the will.
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First archival date: 2018-05-06
Latest version: 2 (2018-11-19)
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