Illusory world skepticism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3):1049-1057 (2024)
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Abstract

l argue that, contra Chalmers,a skeptical scenario involving deception is a genuine possibility,even if he is correct that simulations are real. I call this new skeptical position “Illusory World Skepticism.” Illusory World Skepticism draws from the simulation argument,together with work in physics,astrobiology, and AI,to argue that we may indeed be in an illusory world—a universe scale simulation orchestrated by a deceptive AI—the technophilosopher’s ultimate evil demon. In Section One I urge that Illusory World Skepticism is a bone fide skeptical possibility. In Section Two, I explore features of quantum computation. Then, in Sections Three and Four, I draw from the discussion of quantum computation and assume that the simulation argument is correct,applying considerations from the fields of astrobiology and AI safety to illustrate that illusory world skepticism constitutes what I call “a serious epistemic threat”, a scenario that cannot be dismissed as requiring that knowledge is certainty or which seems to just depict a remote, fictional situation.

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Susan Schneider
Florida Atlantic University

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