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The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology
In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 75-91 (2020)
Abstract
I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.Author's Profile
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2020-12-30
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107 (#34,167)
2020-12-30
Downloads
519 (#30,414)
6 months
107 (#34,167)
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