Why not believe in an evil God? Pragmatic encroachment and some implications for philosophy of religion

Religious Studies 52 (3):345-360 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy of religion, arguing that practical and contextual as well as alethic considerations are properly central to the discipline.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
346 ( #11,803 of 47,111 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #17,490 of 47,111 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.