What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism

Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846 (2015)
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Abstract

Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles to give up on the other.

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Miguel Angel Sebastian
National Autonomous University of Mexico

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