Responsibility Without Identity

The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132 (2012)
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Abstract
Many people believe that for someone to now be responsible for some past action, the agent of that action and the responsible agent now must be one and the same person. In other words, many people that moral responsibility presupposes numerical personal identity. In this paper, I show why this platitude is false. I then suggest an account of what actual metaphysical relationship moral responsibility presupposes instead.
ISBN(s)
1062-6239
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHORWI-3
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Archival date: 2018-06-02
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2012-10-11

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