Responsibility Without Identity

The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many people believe that for someone to now be responsible for some past action, the agent of that action and the responsible agent now must be one and the same person. In other words, many people that moral responsibility presupposes numerical personal identity. In this paper, I show why this platitude is false. I then suggest an account of what actual metaphysical relationship moral responsibility presupposes instead.
Categories
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
1062-6239
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHORWI-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-06-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore

View all 68 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Is Blameworthiness Forever?Khoury, Andrew C. & Matheson, Benjamin
Diachronic Self-Making.Kovacs, David Mark

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-10-11

Total views
324 ( #13,799 of 50,147 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #22,361 of 50,147 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.