The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain to Animal Welfare

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 23 (2):152-162 (2014)
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Abstract

Recent results from the neurosciences demonstrate that pleasure and pain are not two symmetrical poles of a single scale of experience but in fact two different types of experiences altogether, with dramatically different contributions to well-being. These differences between pleasure and pain and the general finding that “the bad is stronger than the good” have important implications for our treatment of nonhuman animals. In particular, whereas animal experimentation that causes suffering might be justified if it leads to the prevention of more suffering, it can never by justified merely by leading to increased levels of happiness

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Adam Shriver
Drake University

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