Rich or thin?

Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne

In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-80 (2016) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties

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Author Profiles

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Harvard University

Archival history

First archival date: 2015-12-01
Latest version: 3 (2023-04-20)
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Categories

Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability in Philosophy of Mind

Modularity in Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The Contents of Perception, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

The Experience of High-Level Properties in Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

high-level contents of perception consciousness perception perceptual experience

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