The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SILTCN-11
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2018-05-31)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard

View all 85 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Emotional Justification.Echeverri, Santiago

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-08-22

Total views
759 ( #2,506 of 38,965 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #21,282 of 38,965 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.