The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1) (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems.

Author's Profile

Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-08-22

Downloads
1,419 (#6,783)

6 months
134 (#21,180)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?