Where are virtues?

Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2331-2349 (2018)
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Abstract
This paper argues that the question, ‘where are virtues?’ demands a response from virtue theorists. Despite the polarizing nature of debates about the relevance of empirical work in psychology for virtue theory, I first show that there is widespread agreement about the underlying structure of virtue. Namely, that virtues are comprised of cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show that there are well-developed arguments that cognitive processes can extend beyond the agent. Then, I show that there are similarly well-developed arguments that affective processes can extend beyond the agent. I then introduce three cases to establish that these cognitive and affective processes are relevantly similar to the cognitive and affective processes countenanced by plausible theories of virtue. Finally, I conclude that virtue theorists must abandon default internalism, the view that the cognitive and affective processes comprising virtues are internal to the agent.
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2018, 2019
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Archival date: 2018-06-21
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The Extended Mind.Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J.
Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel & Gallagher, Shaun

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2018-06-15

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