Idealism and illusions

European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):137-151 (2020)
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Abstract

According to the idealist, facts about phenomenal experience determine facts about the physical world. Any such view must account for illusions: cases where there is a discrepancy between the physical world and our experiences of it. In this paper, I critique some recent idealist treatments of illusions before presenting my own preferred account. I then argue that, initial impressions notwithstanding, it is actually the realist who has difficulties properly accounting for illusions.

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Robert Smithson
University of North Carolina at Wilmington

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