Pain for objectivists: The case of matters of mere taste

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.

Author's Profile

David Sobel
Syracuse University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
570 (#25,733)

6 months
80 (#46,951)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?