On Whether we Can See Intentions

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):150-170 (2017)
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Abstract

Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.

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Shannon Spaulding
Oklahoma State University

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