What Physical Properties Are

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):201-225 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper concerns the question of how to specify what is to count as physical for the purposes of debates concerning either physicalism or the completeness of physics. I argue that what is needed from an account of the physical depends primarily on the particular issue at stake, and that the demand for a general a priori specification of the physical is misplaced. A number of attempts to say what should be counted as physical are defended from recent attacks by Chris Daly, and a specific proposal due to David Papineau developed and extended. I argue that this approach is more than suitable for the debates for which it is intended.

Author's Profile

David Spurrett
University of KwaZulu-Natal

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-23

Downloads
588 (#24,703)

6 months
214 (#10,033)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?