On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation

Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158 (2015)
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Abstract

In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I close with some general considerations on the use of revision-theoretic methods in theories of truth.

Author's Profile

Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University

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