Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis

In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge. pp. 138–159 (2018)
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Abstract

In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this is an unsatisfactory way of reading Lotze’s Platonism and that the Ricketts-Reck reading of Frege is in fact the correct way of thinking about Lotze’s Platonism.

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Nicholas Stang
University of Toronto, St. George

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