“Population” Is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds

Biological Theory 5 (2):154-160 (2010)
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Abstract
Millstein (2009) argues against conceptual pluralism with respect to the definition of “population,” and proposes her own definition of the term. I challenge both Millstein's negative arguments against conceptual pluralism and her positive proposal for a singular definition of population. The concept of population, I argue, does not refer to a natural kind; populations are constructs of biologists variably defined by contexts of inquiry.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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