Debunking Moral Generalism: New Vindications of Moral Particularism

Vienna: LIT Verlag (2025)
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Abstract

In this book, the idea of moral generalism, i.e. morality depends on moral principles, and its arguments are debunked. The author argues that there are no substantive true moral generalizations, and that the existence and provision of such generalizations are not necessary conditions for plausible moral thought, action and education.

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Dominikus Sukristiono
Sanata Dharma University

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