The Dark Room Problem

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24 (5):346-348 (2020)
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Abstract
Predictive Processing theories hold that the mind’s core aim is to minimize prediction-error about its experiences. But prediction-error minimization can be 'hacked', by placing oneself in highly predictable environments where nothing happens. Recent philosophical work suggests that this is a surprisingly serious challenge, highlighting the obstacles facing ‘theories-of-everything’ in psychology.
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Archival date: 2020-04-17
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