Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke

Res Philosophica 95 (4):761-784 (2018) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.

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Harvard University

Archival history

First archival date: 2018-08-31
Latest version: 2 (2018-09-07)
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Categories

Disjunctivism in Philosophy of Mind

Inference in Epistemology

Perceptual Justification in Philosophy of Mind

The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

perceptual experience cognitive penetration perceptual justification predictive perception

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ISBN(s)

21689105

DOI

10.11612/resphil.1759

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