The nature of naming and the analogy of being: McInerny and the denial of a proper analogy of being

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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of whether there is a proper analogy of being according to both meaning and being. I disagree with Ralph McInerny’s understanding of how things are named through concepts and argue that McInerny’s account does not allow for the thing represented by the name to be known in itself. In his understanding of analogy, only ideas of things may be known. This results in a wholesale inability to name things at all and thereby forces McInerny to relegate naming to a purely logical concern. As a consequence, for McInerny, since naming becomes only a logical concern, being itself cannot be known as analogous according to being and meaning since naming only involves the naming of ideas, not of things
ISBN(s)
0019-0365
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SYMTNO
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Archival date: 2018-09-26
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2009-01-28

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