What seemings seem to be

Episteme 12 (3):363-384 (2015)
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Abstract
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if it seems to a subject S that P, S thereby has some degree of (defeasible) justification for believing P. But what is it for P to seem true? Answering this question is vital for assessing what role (if any) such states can play. Many have appeared to adopt a kind of non-reductionism that construes seemings as intentional states which cannot be reduced to more familiar mental states like beliefs or sensations. In this paper I aim to show that reductive accounts need to be taken more seriously by illustrating the plausibility of identifying seemings and conscious inclinations to form a belief. I briefly close the paper by considering the implications such an analysis might have for views such as PC.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Interpreting Intuitions.McGahhey, Marcus & Van Leeuwen, Neil
Seemings as Sui Generis.McAllister, Blake

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2015-04-09

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