Against Deductive Closure

Theoria 83 (2):103-119 (2017)
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Abstract

The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences.

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Paul D. Thorn
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

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