Causality and Intrinsic Information

Abstract

This text will discuss the concept of information and its relevance in the study of the nature of the mind. It will analyze a hypothesis that deals with the equivalence between information and causality, which results in information having a double ontological character: “intrinsic” and “extrinsic.” A discussion will follow on Integrated Information Theory, which is developed from a variation of this thesis. It will be proposed that this theory does not reach the objective of being an “intrinsic” information theory, precisely because it is an adaptation of classical information theory. For this reason, it neither allows nor avoids the paradoxes of the subject–object distinction, nor shows how the causal evolution of an integrated system can be treated in informational terms; that is, it cannot unite causality and information.

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2018-07-27

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